Literary Art and Moral Values by Tsanoff, Radoslav A.
LITERARY ART AND MORAL VALUES 
by Radoslav A .  Tsanoff 
I should state clearly the basic point of view from which this discussion 
will proceed. It is the view of the normally integral character of human 
nature. Our bodies are rightly described as organisms, in which every part 
is truly and organically related to other organs and to the entire bodily 
constitution. Eyes, ears, brain, lungs, heart, hands, and feet do not operate 
each on its own but always in some active correlation. Likewise with every 
other aspect of our being. Of course, we may and we do distinguish our 
various activities-sense-perceptions, emotions, rational processes, imagin- 
ative creative activities, volitions, But these are all related to the character 
of our personality. We may and should distinguish them, but they cannot 
be separated and isolated from each other. And the more important is the 
activity which we are considering, the more thoroughly and vitally it is 
related to the other activities and aspects of our whole nature. This integral 
view of personality is essential to any adequate understanding of ourselvcs, 
although we often tend to forget it. So it is necessary to remind ourselves 
of it, and perhaps one profit of our discussion will be to emphasize this 
truth about human personality. 
Critical thinking should grasp the distinguishing character of the arts 
without isolating them from the rest of experience, by recognizing the 
relation of art to the other human activities. In our age the Italian 
philosopher Benedetto Croce undertook to point out the essential character 
of art in his Breviary of Aesthetic. This work has especial interest at Ricc 
University, for it was first presented as a series of lectures at the opening 
of the Rice Institute, in October, 1912. Croce asked: "What is Art?" and 
proceeded to answer the question by a fourfold negation of statement of 
what art is not. First, he said, art is not a physical fact; it is not a material 
thing or object. Second, art is not a utilitarian act; its essential feature is 
not its usefulness or pleasurable quality. Third, it is not conceptual 
knowledge; it is not meant primarily to teach or instruct us. And fourth, 
it is not moral activity; it is not an edifying or reforming process or 
Editor's Note: This address was the Bartlett Aesthetics Lecture at Rice University for 
1961. Mr. Tsanoff is Trustee Distinguished Professor of Humanities at Rice University. 
(91 ) 
92 KlCE UNIVERSITY STUDIES 
product, either individual or social. What is it, then? Croce answcred: 
Art is vision, contemplation, and essentially it is expression. 
Let us underline this word, expression. Note that expression is a phase 
of almost any human experience, and in the interest of clarity we must 
strive to avoid vague all-inclusiveness when wc use it in aesthetics. To 
describe art more specifically, we require some qualifying terms, such as 
imaginative expression, or an expression of somc aspect or object of 
cxperience with creative form and design, or an cxpression which reveals 
somc significant slant or vision, or else some emotional tone of creative 
intelligence. 
We are critically concerned herc with the manner, the object, and thc 
content of artistic expression. These three preserve some common features 
in all the various forms of art, but we observe also important differences. 
Some of the characteristics which Croce rightly refused to regard as the 
central essentials of art do actually color and qualify some particular forms 
of art more than others. While aesthetic value cannot be reduced basically 
to a judgment of utility, function must surely enter in the plan, production, 
and appraisal of a work of architecture. Many different designs may be 
beautiful, each in its place and for its purpose, but could you imagine an 
architect designing the Rayzor Hall of Humanities, alongside our Fondren 
Library, as a Swiss chalet? And while art may not be defined essentially 
as a physical fact, not only a cathedral but also a painting or a statue do 
have a certain physical objectivity. 
Likewise the intellectual content or reference, what the work of art 
means or connotes: it is not the kernel of all artistic expression, yet in 
many works of art it is an important element. You can spread an OrientaI 
rug of geometric figures in church or synagogue or mosque or Buddhist 
temple; but a similar indiscriminate distribution of painted or sculptured 
Madonnas in Mohammedan or Hinduist shrines wotlld be precluded 
artistically as well as religiously. In the rich field of our complex and 
versatile mental life, artistic expression is bound to reflect, in various 
degrees, this or that phase of human character and experience: to include 
some but to neglect or subordinate others. 
In this discourse the main attention will be devoted to Croce's fourth 
statement of what art is not, namely, moral activity. If aesthetic expression, 
which pervades and enkindles the creative life of the imagination, touches 
and is somehow affected in its various forms by the other phases of our 
experience, can moral import be entirely alien to art? Surely, art cannot 
be altogether neutral or resistant to the moral values which form so vital 
a part of our humanity. 
This moral concern and involvement may be relevant in certain forms 
of art only incidentally or scarcely at all, but in others it inay be of vital 
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importance. We should have no zeal for subjecting arabesques or mosaics 
to moral appraisal; on the other hand, an utter exclusion of moral consid- 
erations in the appraisal of a tragedy would be tragic indeed. Although we 
may not rule out as entirely unreasonable an inquiry into the moral 
elements in the artistic worth of certain paintings or statues, and even 
more directly into the moral springs and currents of musical art, our 
direct concern on this occasion will be with literary art and moral values. 
We should explore some of their interrelations. 
The first important discussion of the interplay of moral and aesthetic 
values is that of Plato. Plato's reflections on this subject proceed in two 
directions, or rather on two levels, and later thought has given one of 
them more than its share of attention and criticism. Plato's first principle 
in his philosophy of life is the principle of harmonious realization and 
fulfillment of all sides of human nature, with the right distribution of 
emphasis. The perfection of man consists in his recognizing the highest 
values and giving them first place in his life, in his keeping less important 
goods subordinate, and in his rejection of low or corrupting inclinations. 
0's ideal of human character was the achievement of rational 
ny, but his examination of human nature disclosed many conflicting 
rests and capacities, How are these to be correlated intelligently? 
are creatures of desires, moved by appetites and passions which 
not be suppressed altogether but which must be controlled and mod- 
d, lest in their intemperate indulgence they lure us to dissipation and 
. We are also stirred by a dynamic of will-energy or mettle; it drives 
action and is a prime determinant of our vigorous life of achievement. 
this energetic sweep of our powers can prove destructive if it is not 
ed in the right direction. Plato therefore emphasized the need of 
nal direction of our active will, to keep us from impetuous plunging 
saster. We need the dominance of reason to control our appetites 
assions and to direct our will-energy in its onward drive. 
life of excellence must have this quality of harmony and radiant 
, without confusion or misdirection or corruption of purposes and 
actions. It must be a life of temperance, courage, and wisdom. Its 
tial characteristic is the due recognition of all our powers and inter- 
in rational harmony. So Plato called the chief virtue of his practical 
ophy of life "justice": giving everything its due. 
development of this philosophy naturally raises the question: In 
a well-ordered life, what is to be the role of poetry and of the arts 
erally? Plato gives a double answer to this question. As a severe critic 
corrupting and pernicious influences of poetry and art, he 
moral censorship of the arts in his ideal republic. A superficial 
er may be led to infer that Plato was unresponsive aesthetically, but 
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this would be altogether unwarranted. Plato is tlic supreme artist of 
philosophical style, and he is critical of some forms of art just because 
he was intensely conscious of the great power of art and the high function 
of true beauty. So he wrote: "Let our artists be those who are gifted to 
discern the true nature of the beautiful and graceful; then will our youth 
dwell in a land of health, amid fair sights and sounds, and receive the 
good in everything; and beauty, the effluence of fair works, shall flow 
into the eye and ear, like a health-giving breeze from a purer region, and 
insensibly draw the soul from the earliest years into likeness and sympathy 
with the beauty of reason. . . . And when a beautiful soul harmonizcs 
with a beautiful form, and the two are cast in one mould, that will be the 
fairest of sights to him who has eyes to see it." 
This is Plato's ideal for poetry and the arts: the expression, through 
the creative imagination, of a true insight into nature and human charac- 
ter, without shallow or perverse onesidedness, without distortion or 
exaggeration. This is the philosophical expression of the Classical spirit: 
balanced, harmonious, rational contemplation and expression. 
Against this high vision which he entertained for poetry and the arts Plato 
denounced artistic corruptions. He saw corruption in the arts of his timc, but 
he probed and exposed taints even in Hesiod and Homer. These are great 
poets, and Plato acknowledged Homer as the greatest of all, but he felt 
that we must resist the lure of their mighty speech when they express 
misleading ideas of human character or traditional but unworthy views 
of divine perfection. We cannot allow any poet, not even Homer, to lead 
us astray, especially our youth who start their education with the Iliad 
and the Odyssey. 
Plato's views involve us in the essentiaI issues of our problem. We 
should agree with Plato that art is not mere amusement of oneself or 
others. For better or  worse, it is a powerful force in our lives and therefore 
it is a matter of great importance and concern. But I doubt if we share 
his view that poets and dramatists should be subjected to moral censorship 
of their works, We ask: Who is to do the censoring and by what standards? 
And further and more to the main point, we may question whether poetry, 
or aesthetic values generally, should be subordinated to explicitly moral 
values. The issues involved in our problem seem to be of two sorts; the 
proposed solutions are also twofold, and they do not have equal merit. 
First, we may distinguish moral and aesthetic values and question the 
warrant for subjecting literary works to moral judgment. Against such 
proposed censorship some men have always proclaimed the autonomy of 
literature and the arts to play their own roles in human experience, without 
intrusion or dictation by any other concern, intellectual or moral. But 
there is a second way of Iooking at our problem, in which the alternatives 
LITERARY ART AND MORAL VALUES 95 
would require revision. We may start by recognizing the ideal integrity of 
our higher life, in which the various distinguishable values-intellectual, 
aesthetic, moral, religious-are actually in continual interplay. Each of 
these values reflects and influences the others, and defective development 
in any of them would affect the others adversely. A narrow or shallow 
intellectual life would be reflected in a one-sided morality or a routine art. 
A stiffly conformist or prudish morality would be intolerant of intellectual 
critical reconstruction as well as of artistic freedom and utmost expression. 
A willful literary or rampant artistic imagination would be unresponsive to 
sober rational appeal or moral protest. Sound judgment here cannot be 
imposed arbitrarily by any one of these three values upon the others, but 
should express the sovereign worth of spiritual integrity that should guide 
all three of them. 
Let us now examine these two views of the interplay of morality and 
art. Our choice to deal more specifically with literature is justified here, 
because the literary arts-poetry, novel, drama-deal directly with human 
character and experience, find their expression in ideas and language, 
and thus are involved more definitely with moral problems. As a proposal 
to subject literature to an explicitly moral judgment, a moralistic aesthetic, 
we may consider Tolstoy's work, What is Art? Tolstoy proposed both a 
definition and an evaluation of art. A work of art, in his view, is the 
effective imaginative communication of feelings. This emotional contagion 
of a poem, a novel, a drama, may be good or bad art, Tolstoy maintained, 
depending upon the kind of emotion which is expressed and comnluni- 
cated. A work of literary art which transmits corrupt feelings is bad art, 
and the best art is that which arouses the highest feelings, namely, the 
religious emotions-love of God and loving sympathy with our fellowmen. 
From this point of view Tolstoy appraised literature as morally and 
socially binding or else as a disruptive force, Against any exclusive, 
morbid, erotic, or otherwise perverse and corrupt literature, he cham- 
pioned preeminently two kinds of literary works: those which, like the 
folksongs and tales of popular tradition, express with simple clarity the 
feelings, the joys and sorrows of mankind; and those which, like the 
inspired words of prophets and saints, rouse in men the supreme emotions 
of moral regeneration and religious devotion. As we may surmise, a great 
deal of famous literature, by this moralistic standard, was rejected as 
unworthy. On his top shelf of good literature, Tolstoy put works of lofty 
humanitarian appeal, like Schiller's Robbers and Victor Hugo's Les Mis- 
&rubles, along with The Christmas Carol and Adam Bede and Uncle Tom's 
Cabin. In his old age Tolstoy passed severe judgment on many of his own 
works. War and Peace and Anna Karenina could not pass his moral test, 
and he would retain as his own choice writings only some of his tales of 
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universal popular tone which any peasant could understand, and his 
stories of moral and religious appeal: "God Sees the Truth," "Walk in 
the Light." This is Tolstoy's conclusion: "The destiny of art in our time 
is to transmit from the realm of reason to the realm of feeling the truth 
that well-being for men consists in their being united together, and to 
set up, in place of the existing reign of force, that Kingdom of God, that 
is of love, which we all recognize to be the highest aim of human life." 
In spite of the lofty idealism of Tolstoy's moral outlook and his deeply 
religious plea for human betterment and fellowship in peace and justice, 
can we follow him in his moralistic judgment of literary art? The artist 
may protest that his artistic function is imaginative expression to the 
utmost. The poet, the novelist, the dramatist are not, as artists, impelled 
either by a moral or an immoral motivation. Their works are not meant 
explicitly to arouse either noble or corrupt emotions. Artists are not 
intentionally either reformers or seducers. Their works are echoes and 
visions across the entire gamut of human experience, luminous or dark, 
noble or ignoble. 
What the artist finds objectionable in a moralistic aesthetics, is the 
presumption of the moralist to bring literature and the other arts before 
his own court of justice, with himself as moralizer sitting at the bench 
and pronouncing judgment. By what warrant can we thus magisterially 
subordinate aesthetic values to moral values? To the moralist's severe 
judgment of his works, the artist may well reply: "I may not conform to 
your moral rules, but let me tell you that you do not meet my artistic 
standards. You are dull and rigid and unresponsive to so much of human 
experience which arouses me with its living imaginative appeal." 
This counterblast from the artist at the moralistic judge of art is not 
altogether astray, but it also misses the mark. The artist may rightly 
resist moralistic censorship, but can he proceed as if his work had no 
bearing on the other values of life? Artist and moralist alike must recog- 
nize that there is a court of value judgments. It is the court of the ideal 
integrity of our higher life, and upon its true verdicts depend our fulfill- 
ment and our perfection as human beings. Before that court all values- 
morality and art and intellectual activity and religion-have to be appraised 
in their bearing and mutual influence on each other and in their right or 
wrong contribution to  the true fruition of our character. 
The resistance to subjecting a literary work to a moral or rather to a 
moralizing judgment does not warrant the dismissal of any moral consid- 
erations in our appraisal of literature. For good or for ill, literature itself 
is a great moral force. It affects morality, and our appraisal of it naturally 
includes moral considerations. The recognition of these moral bearings of 
art, without unwarranted moralizing, was expressed significantly by the 
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German poet and philosopher Friedrich SchilIer. In his Letters oiz the 
sthetic Education of Man Schiller definitely rejected any edifying or 
the artist. As his own poems and dramatic works 
pirit of romantic revolt towards classical balance 
serenity of human outlook, he was impressed by the important dis- 
tion between the right direction which great and good art may give 
tion, on the one hand, and, on the other 
propaganda, which he resisted as inappropriate 
of the imagination; it is the free expression 
that expression is not forced by extraneous 
of any sort, utilitarian or moralistic, and when it is not distorted 
appetites but achieves integrity of per- 
ic experience may and does act as a morally 
e of the term "moral." Schiller empha- 
refinement is essential to the attainment 
oral character. Moral progress is within our reach when in our 
we rise from the common sensual appetites 
vulgar feelings to aesthetic perception of the beautiful. "When we 
in a man the signs of a pure and disinterested esteem, we can infer 
n place in his nature and that humanity has 
ilar view of the problem in his essay, A Defence of 
e in his works, as for instance in the 
ey avowed his "passion for reforming the 
not permit this passion to direct his creative work 
poetry is my abhorrence." He maintained a dual 
eant to inculcate morals, but it does advance the 
ankind. The effect of poetry is to awaken and 
poet's inspired speech can arouse our love 
ght and in action; poetry enriches our higher life 
to be greatly good, must imagine intensely and 
himself in the place of another and of many 
ent of moral good is the imagination; and 
effect by acting upon the cause." 
us pursue this line of thought further. A poet cannot assume the 
the moralist, the reformer, or the propagandist of any sort. But 
other hand he cannot be morally dull or corrupt. If he is really 
t, his creative imagination will be the utterance of deep insight 
s through the whole range of human life; it must be expression 
organization and integrity of character. Without any explicit 
ing or admonition, by his poetry itself, he will appeal to our inmost 
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nature, he will stir our imagination to fuller integrity of all-human response. 
Men that read poetry of this sort are not merely entertained, nor yet are 
they lured and seduced into wayward sensuality. They are deepened and 
expanded spiritually. With quickened spirits they can face their own lives 
more humanely, with a more mature imagination. How can a poem be 
great if it stiffens or corrupts our spirit? Truly lofty poetry redeems man- 
kind from dull narrowness and vulgarity and corruption of sense and 
hardness of heart and softness of thought. 
We may note that in this discussion of the moral dynamic of great 
poetry we are moving towards a deeper understanding of morality as 
well as of art. The common view of morals is apt to limit it to certain 
specific areas of conduct reflected in the conventional virtues and vices. 
When we call anyone moral or immoral we are apt to be understood as 
speaking, in one way or the other, of that person's honesty, truthfulness, 
sexual uncontamination, fair dealing. Qualities of thought or taste or 
refinement or creative expression or spiritual vision may enter into our 
total evaluation of a person, but traditional judgment scarcely regards 
them as essentially moral in connotation. My mind may be shallow or 
dull; my taste may be vulgar and my manners coarse; I may be bigoted 
and superstitious. Your criticism of me in all these respects may not alter 
your esteem for me as, just the same, a good moral person. Observe now: 
is it not this limited view of morality which is often expressed in moralistic 
censure of certain types of literature and art? 
More thorough ethical reflection may lead us to a deeper insight into 
the nature and range of morality. The process of maturing moral activity 
is the process of the overall organization of human values and the right 
grading of them according to their relative worth. Ethics has been defined 
concisely as the science of what matters. Morality, in the fuII sense of 
that term, should not be restricted to a certain specific province of choices 
and actions. It is concerned with the direction and fulfillment of person- 
ality across the entire gamut of human experience: in work and in play, 
in appetites and satisfactions individual and social, in cooperation and 
conflict, in intellectual activity, artistic creative expression, religious 
devotion. All of these values play their respective roles in the fulfillment 
or frustration of personality, and all of them concern morality. 
What we are emphasizing here is the importance of recognizing the 
integrity and the correlative character of the higher life of values. This has 
been called the principle of the identity of ideals. The term may be 
misleading. Art is not identical with morals, nor is either of them to be 
equated with intelligence. While we should not separate intelligence, art, 
and morality, they are clearly distinguishable. Any part of our experience 
may become for us a matter of inquiry and understanding, an inspiration 
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to creative expression, or a problem of choice between alternatives in 
conduct. And in any one of these three ways the experience in question 
may proceed to great fulfillment of ourselves or else to frustration. What 
is really important in this or in any other experience is not what particular 
value engages us prevailingly, nor whether we shift our emphasis from 
one value to another, but whether our experience in question proceeds 
to consummation or to breakdown. What matters preeminently is not so 
much whether we are engaged in thought or in creative song or in choice 
of action, but rather this, how we think and sing and act. 
The characteristic response of the intellectual, the poetic, or  the moral 
side of our personality is likely to be expressed preferentially on different 
occasions. Galileo at his telescope observing the moons of Jupiter, and 
Galileo before his judges of the Inquisition: here is the same personality 
proceeding to different self-expressions: an intellectual adventure of the 
mind in the one case, a personal crisis in the other. We have been told 
that there is some discovery in each artist's invention and some invention 
in every scientific discovery. So Weierstrass wrote that "a mathematician 
who is not somewhat of a poet will never be a perfect mathematician." 
Poincark explicitly stated that in the formulation of a theory a great 
scientist is moved not only by logical rigor but also by a certain alert 
responsiveness to order and harmony. He called it a "feeling of mathe- 
matical beauty and elegance," analogous to artistic perfection. I call your 
attention to these kinships where few of us would be likely to  look for 
them, the kinship of poetic inspiration and mathematical reasoning. 
In the light of this broad discussion of the distinctiveness but also of 
the interrelation of the principal values, the problem of literary art and 
moral values can be considered in a clearer perspective. We have been 
told: "As a man thinketh, so is he." We may add: so he feels, so he 
imagines, so he acts. These are all in various ways correlative. Was it 
Plotinus who wrote: "A great contemplation makes a great object of 
contemplation?" We may cite here Montaigne's appraisal of the Italian 
Renaissance historian Francesco Guicciardini. Montaigne pays tribute to 
Guicciardini's candid and forthright accounts of the men whose careers 
he reports in his memoirs. But Montaigne also writes: "I have noted this, 
that of so many souls and actions that he judges, so many motives and 
plans, he never refers a single one to virtue, religion, and conscience, as 
if these qualities were wholly extinct in the world; and of all actions, 
however fair in appearance they may be of themselves, he throws the 
cause back onto some vicious motive or some profit. It  is impossible to 
imagine that among the infinite number of actions that he judges there 
was not a single one produced by the way of reason. No corruption can 
have seized men so universally that someone would not escape the conta- 
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gion. This makes me fear that his taste was a bit corrupted; and it may 
have happened that he judged others by himself." This passage has been 
chosen deliberately from Montaigne, for every reader of his Essays knows 
that he is without any prudery or conventional conformity, that he is in 
fact one of the "robustious" writers, not all of whose pages would bear 
reading aloud. And precisely he, Montaigne, notes that Guicciardini's 
portrayal of men often betrays his own warped outlook on life. 
A poet's imaginative vision and version of human life reflects the range 
of his own sight and insight. We should be very clear at this point. I t  is 
true that intellectual grasp and imaginative expression may not be equally 
developed in a mind. You would not expect rigorous logical exposition 
from John Keats or beautiful poetry from Charles Darwin, But whatever 
view or meaning of life is expressed imaginatively by a poet must needs 
reflect the range and depth of his thinking, such as it is. He cannot reveal 
more than he sees. In the aesthetic enjoyment which we experience in 
reading a supreme poet, Shakespeare, we may perceive as Coleridge tells 
us that "the creative power and the intellectual energy wrestle as in a 
war embrace." 
Note this deeply revealing quality of great poetic expression. We may 
cite an instance from an early scene in Macbeth. In his conversation with 
Lady Macbeth, Macbeth tells her about his meeting with the witches and of 
their prophecy that he is t o  become king of Scotland. Then he informs her 
of the King's projected visit to  their castle: "Duncan comes home tonight." 
She asks: "And when goes hence?" Macbeth replies: "Tomorrow as he 
purposes." With only three words, Shakespeare has disclosed Macbeth's 
whole soul and state of mind, what he is half planning but not yet ready to 
put into words. The marvel is not only the poetic one of expressing it all in 
three words, but the mastery of insight and thought, t o  realize that more 
than those three words could not have been truly said at that moment. 
This natural interplay of thought and imagination in mental activity, 
of a higher or a lower rank, may be seen even more convincingly in the 
relation of imaginative expression and moral insight. For our moral judg- 
ments are verdicts; they have an emotional tone of advocacy or rejection; 
beyond formulation, they flow easily into living imaginative utterance. 
We need not proceed to extreme unwarranted emphasis here and deny 
any intellectual insight or validity to moral judgment. But surely, from 
the aspect of logical reflection, we can see the kindred tone of the moral 
and the aesthetic consciousness. 
Shakespeare, we are told, held the mirror to nature, but that mirror of 
imaginative utterance was not a morally neutral mirror. I t  did not reflect 
Othello and Iago and Desdemona all three in morally indifferent valuation, 
nor does it arouse in us a morally indifferent response. We need not 
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classify the dramatic poet's characters in rigidly conventional terms as the 
tragic hero and the villain and the innocent victim; but surely our inter- 
pretation and our aesthetic appreciation of the tragedy is inconceivable 
without an insight into its moral temper. Could you imagine Shakespeare 
putting Puck among the dramatis personae of Othello, tripping his gay 
comment on human confusion: "What fools these mortals be!" And as in 
Othello, so in Lear and Hamlet and Anthony and Cleopatm: always the 
tragedy is a tragedy by the measure of the moral tone which colors its 
imaginative expression throughout. Turn to some of Shakespeare's greatest 
pages-to Hamlet's soliloquy or Macbeth's last ruinous reflection on life, 
and try to gauge their poetic worth for a mind utterly indifferent to moral 
values. Let us put this matter to a direct test. Let us consider a dissolute 
profligate to whom the word "adultery" is sensually enticing and without 
any tone of moral revulsion. Now let us all listen with him to Hamlet as 
he tries to sear with burning words his condemnation of his adulterous 
mother's moral degradation: 
Look here, upon this picture, and on this, 
The counterfeit presentment of two brothers: . . . 
This was your husband. Look you now what follows: 
Here is your husband; . . . Have you eyes? 
. . . What judgment 
Would you step from this to this? 
Queen Gertrude's act in replacing her former worthy husband by this 
"mildewed ear'' 
Calls virtue hypocrite, takes off the rose 
From the fair forehead of an innocent love, 
And sets a blister there. . . . 
Such a deed 
As from the body of contraction plucks 
The very soul, and sweet religion makes 
A rhapsody of words . . . 
are your response at this moment to Shakespeare's lines with that of 
shameless rake, and then judge whether dramatic poetry can be 
essed or appreciated without reference to moral values. 
turn from Shakespeare to another master of literary art whom we 
already considered, Tolstoy. In Anna Karenina Tolstoy portrays 
a's abandonment of her aduIterous passion for Alexey Vronsky, but 
the revulsion of her moral nature: "In dreams, when she had no 
trol over her thoughts, her position presented itself to her in all its 
eous nakedness, One dream haunted her almost every night. She 
amed that both of them were her husband at once, that both were 
shing caresses upon her. Alexey Alexandrovitch was weeping, kissing 
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her hands and saying, 'How happy we are now!' And Alexey Vronsky was 
there, too; and he, too, was her husband. And she was marvelling that 
it had seemed impossible to her, was explaining to them, laughing, that 
this was ever so much simpler, and that now both of them were happy and 
contented. But this dream weighed upon her like a nightmare, and she 
awoke from it in terror." 
Let us not miss the point here. I am not speaking of pornography, which 
is to be condemned not only as immoral but as bad art by any standard, 
because in it literature is used as a means to wholly inartistic and meretri- 
cious purposes. By the same token, on the opposite end of the line, we 
must condemn also misdirected literary work which has deliberately 
edifying or tractarian purposes. The intentionally goody-goody must be 
rejected with the designedly corrupt and licentious. 
We say that imaginative vision and utterance is bound to reflect the 
poet's or artist's inteIIectua1 perspective, and what is more closely consid- 
ered here, his moral outlook on life. The poet holds his mirror to life; 
and as is his mirror so will be his reflection. And the quality of the mirror, 
the clarity and range of the poet's moral insight, are tested more severely 
in certain reflections than in others. Even so you can take good pictures 
of twilit or misty scenes with a photographic lens of a high quality but not 
with others, The kind of picture you take describes the sort of subject 
which you are photographing but also the sort of camera that you have, 
and your mastery of it. Human lives have dark, cavernous, and chaotic 
depths and deviations where we are all apt to go astray. Even Dante in 
his portrayal of Hell felt quandaries for his readers as for himself: 
0 ye who have sound intellects, observe 
The doctrine which is here, hiding itself 
Beneath the veil of these unwonted verses. 
The literary artist is not barred from any cavern or swamp or abyss of 
human lives, but precisely in these perilous regions he needs his surest 
footing. He may be portraying the bedlam madhouse of life, but there 
above all he himself needs sanity. All the way through, the quality and 
rank of artistic works must be evaluated by the quality and range, the 
clarity and depth of insight, the balanced and upright organization of 
moral values which have found imaginative expression in the poem or novel 
or drama or whatever other work of literary art we may be considering. 
In objection to  this sort of artistic appraisal, it may be urged that all 
sides of human nature and all human experiences are equally natural and 
equally available for artistic expression from any point of view whatever. 
But the very first principle of evaluation is that values are not all on a par. 
Some are better than others, and to recognize and respect their true 
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hierarchy is the essence of wisdom. The magpie may sing just as naturally 
s the nightingale, but the magpie is no nightingale. Grunts and hiccoughs 
re as natural as songs, but we rank them differently. Chiselled on one of 
ablets on the court facade of our Lovett Hall at Rice are the words 
otinus: "Love, beauty, joy, and worship are forever building, unbuild- 
and rebuilding in each man's soul," These values are not the same, 
in the life of spiritual fulfillment they are achieving some real 
mony. So the artistic activity does not pursue the same path as the 
or the intellectual, yet these three paths do  not point in opposite 
ions. They express three distinguishable but not aIien and conflicting 
in the perfecting of our higher life. 
o mind, not even the greatest, is always moving on its highest level. 
s is true intellectually, artistically, or morally. Aristotle was the most 
yclopedic master of knowledge in classical antiquity, but his mistaken 
centric view of the world retarded the progress of astronomy for 
ost two thousand years. Homer is the unchallenged lord of all epic 
ts, yet his Roman readers observed that sometimes he also nods. There 
pages in the works of some of the greatest novelists, or  dramatists, 
ich are morally dubious or quite astray. These occasional lapses of the 
reme artists are simply regrettable, They provide no warrant for our 
rovaI of similarly defective writing by lesser men. Neither intellectually 
artistically nor morally is an author to be esteemed because forsooth 
work can compare with the worst pages of the great masters. Our 
blem of evaluation can be solved only by appeal to right principle and 
by a parade of impressive names. Geocentric astronomy was and is 
alid despite Aristotle's authority to the contrary; the "Ecclesiastical 
nets" are often dull poetry, even though their author was Wordsworth 
o at his best is in the very front rank of English song; and profligacy 
rofligacy even when it is Baudelaire's. The Gospel test abides: "By their 
ts ye shall know them"; and we have all seen rotten apples on the 
ust as in his thinking or in his moral conduct so in his art, a person 
be moving towards fulfillment and perfection or towards frustration 
corruption. At the height of the Italian Renaissance a young mind of 
ius, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, expressed a vision of human 
iny in words with which we may close this discourse on Literary Art 
Moral Values: "The Creator said to Adam: 'I have set thee in the 
~ d s t  of the world, that thou mayest the more easily behold and see 
1 that is therein. I created thee a being neither heavenly nor earthly, 
either mortal nor immortal only, that thou mightest be free to shape 
to overcome thyself. Thou mayst sink into a beast, or be born anew 
e divine likeness.' " 
